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Abstract 
In Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), therapists use various procedures to 
identify and clarify clients’ personal values with the aim of increasing engagement in 
valued behaviors. This study sought to determine the relative effectiveness of two 
common values procedures. Participants were recruited from a national online sample of 
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Participants that met inclusion criteria and provided 
complete and valid data were included in analyses (N = 236). In this study, a values 
intervention (Values-Alone; VA) and a values intervention with an added behavior-
consistency assessment procedure (VBC condition) were compared with an active control 
condition. Both values procedures involved writing about a topic of concern and 
responding to an assessment of discrete valued actions, such as, “It is important to take 
care of people who are less fortunate.” However, the VBC condition contained an 
additional task of rating consistency between recent behaviors and personal values. The 
control condition consisted of writing tasks and assessment of attitudes on the topic of 
time management practices. Participants were later presented with an opportunity to 
donate a portion of their earnings. Cragg Hurdle Regression Analyses indicated that both 
the VBC and VA conditions effectively increased the likelihood of donation to charity 
compared to the active control condition (b = .56, p = .01; and b = .58, p = .008, 
respectively). However, the VBC and VA conditions did not differ in their relative 
influence on whether or not individuals donated (b = -.02, p = .91). A discussion of study 
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Values in Psychotherapy 
Colloquially, values are understood to encompass domains of living that are 
important to an individual or collective (Bonow & Follette, 2009). They may include 
ways of living (e.g., mindfully), behaviors (e.g., exercise), relationships, or more tangible 
aspects of life (e.g., objects). Within the broader psychology literature, definitions of 
values are similar to this colloquial understanding, although with some variation.  
While different theories may provide different accounts of the functions or 
purposes of values, an examination of the history of psychotherapy traditions reveals that 
values have been widely recognized as relevant to—if not at the heart of—the work of 
psychologists and therapists. Across multiple psychotherapy traditions, there is 
widespread recognition that values serve important functions in the lives of clients and 
can be powerful motivators of behavior.  
 Most psychoanalysts would acknowledge the importance of values in therapy and 
in case conceptualization (Meissner, 1983), although this was not always true. Freud paid 
little attention to values, with only brief mentions that they should be avoided in therapy 
(Lytton, 1983). However, many of Freud’s psychoanalytic successors did not agree with 
this stance (Meissner, 1983; Horowitz, 2014). From a modern Psychoanalytic 
perspective, values consist of complex motivations that are related to drive states, and 
therefore it has been argued that values are important drivers of behavior (Zinberg, 1967). 
One prominent psychoanalyst, John E. Gedo (1979) posited that, “…the personality as a 
whole is most fruitfully understood as a hierarchy of potentials for action, i.e, of both 
organismic and subjective goals, as modified by a system of values” (pp. 11-12; c.f. 
Meissner, 1983). 
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 The importance of values has also been recognized in Humanistic approaches. 
Carl Rogers wrote of valuing as a process of actualization, or fulfilling one’s potential 
(Rogers, 1959) that was basic to the nature of all humans, and that could lead to self-
enhancement if and when individuals were willing to “get close to their own 
experiencing,” or take an open stance toward their inner feelings (Rogers, 1964, p. 165). 
Rogers further believed that human values had potential beyond even self-enhancement, 
positing that human values could enhance social, cultural, and evolutionary processes 
(Rogers, 1964). 
 B.F. Skinner, while not well known in the field of psychology for a concentration 
on values specifically, did conceptualize values as things that are called “good” in the 
environment, or otherwise as positive reinforcers. He believed that values served as 
purposes (or functions) of behavior, and that many values became “good” over the course 
of evolutionary history; what was “good” served advantages to the individual and 
eventually the species (Skinner, 1971; see also Yadavia & Hayes, 2009). 
 In the last two decades, experts from various psychotherapeutic orientations have 
been explicit in their discussions of values as important elements of both theory and 
treatment. Several recent publications detail specific techniques for exploring client 
values in therapy, including techniques specifically for Motivational Interviewing 
(Wagner & Sanchez, 2009), for stand-alone use or as adjunct practices to existing 
treatments (see Cameron, Palm Reed, Guadiano, 2014; Kirschenbaum, 2013; 
Mickelburgh, 1992), and most prevalently at the current time, for use with Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (see Wilson, Sandoz & Kitchens, 2010; Lundgren, Luoma, 
Dahl, Strosahl, & Melin, 2012; Sandoz & Anderson, 2015). Acceptance and Commitment 
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Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012) regards values as a fundamental element of 
its treatment model (Sandoz & Anderson, 2015), and there is reason to believe that ACT 
values procedures effectively motivate engagement in valued life endeavors.  
Values in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
 Values are a core component of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
Hayes, et al. 2012), a trans-diagnostic approach to psychological treatment that has 
demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of a variety of behavioral health and psychological 
problems, including depression, chronic pain, anxiety, substance use, and more (Gundy, 
Woidneck, Pratt, Christian, & Twohig, 2011; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 
2006; Öst, 2008; Powers, Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2009). ACT targets a common root 
cause of many behavioral problems, experiential avoidance, defined as the attempt to 
alter the form or frequency of thoughts, emotions, and other experiences, even when 
doing so is not in the service of desired goals or important values (Hayes, Wilson, 
Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Hayes et al., 2012).  
 The goal of ACT is to enable psychological flexibility, defined as the ability to 
adapt behavior as necessary, with openness to and awareness of the internal and external 
context, to live a life that is directed by one’s personal values (Hayes et al., 2012). The 
psychological flexibility model of ACT (see Figure 1. ACT “Hexaflex” model) is 
simultaneously a model of psychotherapy, psychological health, and psychopathology. 
As such, assessing a client’s strengths and weaknesses according to each core process can 
provide a functional conceptualization of the root of psychological suffering while 
simultaneously serving as a guide for psychotherapy intervention. In the psychological 
flexibility model, there are six core components—acceptance, defusion, present moment 
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awareness, self as context, committed action, and values—each theoretically linked to the 
intended outcome of ACT: increasing psychological flexibility. Each of the six 
components plays a critical role in the conceptualization and treatment of psychological 
problems and is closely connected to values work in ACT.  
 Acceptance is the ongoing voluntary process of choosing to take an open stance 
toward moment-to-moment experiences. It enables people to engage nonjudgmentally 
with private experiences, fostering a stance of openness and curiosity from which people 
can learn from their private experiences. Through acceptance, even uncomfortable 
experiences are available to be noticed, allowing for flexibility in responding to them in 
ways that facilitate 
successful working (Hayes 
et al., 2012). Choosing to 
accept private experiences 
instead of avoiding them 
allows for a wider range of 
valued action. For 
example, a graduate 
student writing an anxiety-
provoking research paper 
can, by practicing 
acceptance, notice that she 
is anxious. She may also notice highly tempting thoughts about shutting off her computer 
and taking a bath; she may start to feel great relief imagining this choice. Through 
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acceptance, however, the student is able to view this action as one of many from which 
she can choose, including uncomfortable actions that, while aversive, are consistent with 
her value of persistence. Consequently, she may choose to make the psychologically 
uncomfortable and values-oriented decision to persist in writing the paper (and taking the 
bath later). 
 Defusion is a process that undermines fusion, which can sometimes be unhelpful. 
Fusion is responding to thoughts not as verbal events, but as though they are real, in a 
literal sense. Fusion occurs through normal language processes in which language 
acquires the stimulus functions of the events and objects in the natural world that it 
symbolizes. In other words, functions in the natural world become fused with the 
functions of language. Consequently, behaviors can fall under control of verbal events to 
the extent that they exert greater control than direct experience. For example, fusion to 
the thought, “I am worthless,” could interfere with engagement in valued activities for 
which ‘worth’ is an inferred prerequisite, such as seeking a desired job promotion.  Even 
with direct experience of ‘worthiness’ of the job position, fusion to “I am worthless,” 
could discourage attempts to achieve it. ACT works to facilitate defusion, which is the 
process of letting go of the literality of one’s cognitions, or detaching oneself from 
thought content. Clients are encouraged to examine the content of thoughts as ‘just 
thoughts’ and assess their workability (e.g., “I am having the thought, ‘I am worthless.’ 
What is this thought doing for me?”). In this way, defusion helps clients gain greater 
control of the stimulus functions of language through reducing attachment to verbal 
events as literal truth (Hayes et al., 2001; Hayes et al., 2012).  
 Present moment awareness involves the intentional allocation of attention toward 
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thoughts, emotions, and/or sensations in the present moment. In order to accept 
experiences and defuse from cognitions as they occur, individuals must be mentally 
present to what is occurring. Many individuals spend a significant amount of time 
engaging in thoughts about the past and the future, as when worrying or ruminating. 
From an ACT perspective, the past and the future consist of memories, stories, or 
constructions that occur in the present moment. Direct experience of the past or the future 
is impossible, and thus paying too much attention to these cognitive experiences and 
failing to notice that one is remembering or imagining in the present moment can detract 
from direct experience of the present context. Present moment awareness enables people 
to observe their experiences as they happen and notice their behavior in the context of 
ongoing events, thus increasing flexibility in choosing how to respond, as necessary, in 
the service of values (Hayes et al., 2012). 
 Self as context is a sense of the ongoing consciousness that is merely observing, 
rather that interacting with, life’s events. It is a sense of the self as a context for the 
multitude of life’s events and experiences to occur, including thoughts and sensations. 
Self as context can be experienced as transcendent, or spiritual. Another dimension of the 
self, the conceptualized self or self as content, is the sense of self we may tell others 
about, and it is the sense of self we generally tell to ourselves. This conceptualized self is 
likely to involve an account of one’s history and tendencies that is coherent and makes 
sense. This verbally constructed self can include positive (e.g., “I am generally a good 
person”) and negative (e.g., “I am a bad person”) beliefs about the self. People typically 
hold tightly to these verbal senses of themselves because self-concept is at the center of 
the many reasons we construct for our behaviors. For example, imagine an instance in 
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which an individual says, “I am an honest person.” After making this statement, this 
individual is witnessed stealing from a store. As a result of making a statement that did 
not reflect his behavior, this individual may be told he was ‘not an honest person.’ Being 
‘wrong’ is an aversive experience associated with ‘bad.’ At the same time, the social 
environment also reinforces a rigid sense of self by demanding and accepting “sensible” 
and “accurate” reasons for behavior. For example, explaining, “I only stole food to eat. I 
forgot my lunch today. I’m usually honest,” would likely be accepted as an explanation 
that made sense, although opinions may vary on whether it was a ‘sufficient’ or socially-
sanctioned reason. Reason-giving is socially reinforced in this way. In the construction of 
reasons for behavior, the conceptualized self is an important point of reference both for 
the constructer and the verbal audience, and as such it can be highly resistant to change 
(Hayes et al., 2001). Fusion to self-conceptualizations can lead to restricted behavioral 
repertoires as we strive to affirm these identities to ourselves and the social world. For 
example, if a person has fused with being ‘smart,’ they may be unwilling to identify 
opportunities for growth in knowledge or to seek out further knowledge. If they are fused 
with being ‘stupid,’ they may avoid challenges, or conversely, they may tirelessly work 
to stave off this thought by directing activity toward success. Fusion to the 
conceptualized self can also lead to self-deception. For instance, if a person has fused 
with the self-concept of being a kind person, they may not be willing to observe 
themselves being cruel, even when their behavior is indeed harmful to others. By 
orienting to the self as context, it is possible to connect with a personal sense of 
wholeness and ongoing presence. This helps individuals to identify with a sense of self 
that is not threatened by life’s events and behaviors—one that is open and flexible to 
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approach and respond to situations as needed (Hayes et al., 2012).  
 Values bring individuals into contact with what matters most to them and are 
considered the motivational component of ACT. From an ACT perspective, values orient 
people toward engagement with important life consequences, verbally establishing 
reinforcement for values-consistent actions (Hayes et al., 2012). The mere verbal 
behavior of stating what one values may increase motivation to behave in ways that are 
consistent with them, and consistent engagement in values-oriented behaviors is 
considered the cornerstone in a “life worth living.” Values, from an ACT perspective, can 
be defined more comprehensively as “…freely chosen verbally constructed consequences 
of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of activity, which establish predominant 
reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioral 
pattern itself” (Wilson & DuFrene, 2009, p.66).  
 ACT therapists emphasize the importance of “choice” in values. When values are 
“freely chosen,” they are not under the aversive control of others’ desires and 
preferences. Choosing values only to please (or displease) the therapist, friends, or even 
the larger culture, can lead to less flexible behavior by diverting attention away from the 
experience of engaging in valued action and instead toward rigidly following a rule (e.g., 
“graduate college, or else mom and dad will feel disappointed”). In contrast, direct 
exposure to naturally reinforcing consequences is believed to sustain motivation to 
engage in valued behavior. Having “free choice” of values is important because it brings 
individuals in contact with the personal experience of engaging in valued actions, 
allowing for more flexibility in values-based actions. 
 While other processes such as acceptance, defusion, present-moment awareness, 
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and self as context are useful processes in sustaining valued engagement, direct training 
of these processes is not always necessary for behavior change; in some cases, the 
motivation to change (or persist in) behavior that is associated with identifying values is 
entirely sufficient. In treatment, ACT therapists encourage the identification of values, 
orienting clients to what matters most to them in the service of making positive 
behavioral changes (Yadavia & Hayes, 2009).  
 Committed action is real-life effective engagement with meaningful life values. 
Through engagement in effective, values-oriented actions, potentially harmful behaviors 
such as inaction, impulsivity, and avoidant persistence are undermined. Committed action 
is considered the ACT component that produces psychological health by bringing clients 
into contact with their values. Through valued engagement, a sense of vitality, 
connectedness, health, and wellbeing is accessible (Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, 
Villate, & Pistorello, 2013; Hayes et al., 2012).  
Evidence for ACT Values 
 Studies on the effects of ACT values procedures have demonstrated that values 
procedures increase engagement in values-oriented behaviors, and that when added to 
other interventions and ACT core processes, they can improve treatment outcomes. Páez-
Blarrina et al. (2008a) demonstrated that a brief ACT values protocol substantially 
increased participants’ willingness to endure painful shocks above the suppression 
control and untrained groups. In this study, seven out of ten participants in the ACT 
values condition (70%) tolerated the maximum amount of pain, compared to one out of 
ten in the suppression condition (10%) and two out of ten (20%) in the untrained 
condition. As a second part of the task, individuals who did not tolerate the maximum 
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amount of shocks in the first task proceeded to receive either an active training of 
defusion or suppression, or continued with no additional training. Participants then 
proceeded to a second pain task that was identical to the first. Of the three remaining 
ACT group participants that proceeded to the second pain task, two participants tolerated 
the maximum amount of pain (66.7%) compared to two out of nine in the suppression 
group (22.2%) and zero out of eight in the untrained group.   
 In a study that examined the effectiveness of an ACT-based online values 
intervention for undergraduate academic performance (Chase et al., 2013), researchers 
compared the grades of students randomized into one of three groups: goal-setting 
training alone, goal-setting training plus a values intervention, or a waitlist control group. 
The goal-setting condition, provided to both experimental conditions, educated 
participants about the importance of goal-setting and how to set challenging goals that are 
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-oriented (SMART). Participants were 
then prompted to set long-term, intermediate, and proximal SMART goals. Then, they 
were asked to list obstacles to goal achievement as well as solutions. Participants were 
also asked why the goal was important to them and what were the potential benefits of 
achieving the goal. In the goal-setting plus values intervention, participants first received 
an academic values intervention prior to the goal-setting program. This intervention 
provided participants with a definition of values from an ACT perspective and 
distinguished them from goals. Then, participants were guided in values identification 
exercises and metaphors that helped clarify the ACT conceptualization of values (e.g., 
comparing valued engagement to moving in a direction on a road map). Lastly, 
participants were asked to write for several minutes about important academic values. 
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Data on cumulative grade point average were collected at pre (beginning of the semester), 
post (end of the semester), and follow-up (end of the subsequent semester). Findings 
showed that the values plus goal-setting training significantly improved GPA from pre- to 
post-intervention, above the goal-setting alone group and waitlist control, with small (d = 
.41) and medium (d= .63) effect sizes, respectively. The goal-setting alone condition had 
no effect on GPA, nor did waitlist condition. However, after the waitlist control later 
received the goal-setting plus values intervention, GPA was significantly improved, with 
a medium effect size (d = .51). At follow-up, the goal-setting plus values group 
deteriorated slightly, although this was not significant either within condition (p= .13) or 
in comparison to the goal-setting alone group (p= .20). 
 Other studies have investigated the additive contribution of personalized values 
procedures to ACT interventions and have demonstrated that values, combined with other 
active ACT components such as acceptance and/or defusion, improves outcomes of pain 
tolerance (Branstetter-Rost, Cushing, & Douleh, 2009; Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008b) and 
pain believability (Páez-Blarrina et al., 2008b). One study of ACT for epilepsy 
(Lundgren, Dahl, & Hayes, 2008) showed that values attainment and persistence in 
valued action in the face of barriers significantly mediated changes in the duration of 
epileptic seizures, ratings of quality of life, and ratings of personal well-being, from pre-
assessment to one-year follow-up. This evidence suggests that ACT values procedures 
have the potential to influence engagement in important life activities.  
 Finally, a study by Gloster and colleagues (2017) demonstrated that increased 
engagement in valued activities led to decreases in suffering for individuals with anxiety. 
In this study, 41 patients diagnosed with panic disorder and/or agoraphobia who were 
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resistant to previous evidence-based treatments were randomized to either active 
treatment or waitlist control. Treatment consisted of 8 (91 to 120-minute) sessions of 
ACT. At every session, participants’ self-rated engagement in valued action and 
experiences of suffering and struggling were measured, along with other treatment-
relevant factors. To assess valued action, they were asked, “How much have you engaged 
in behaviors that are in accord with your values and goals?” To assess struggling, 
participants were asked, “In the last 24 h, how much effort did you put into making 
anxiety-related feelings or thoughts go away (e.g., by suppressing them; distracting 
yourself; reassuring yourself or seeking reassurance from someone else?” Lastly, to 
assess suffering, participants were asked, “In the last 24 h, how upset and distressed over 
anxiety were you?” Results revealed that increased engagement in valued action preceded 
reductions in suffering and that changes in valued action were independent of experiences 
of struggle.  
Mechanisms of Values-Related Behavior Change 
 A theoretical account of the mechanisms of values-related behavior change 
processes can be provided by Relational Frame Theory, a behavioral theory of language 
cognition, and the basic science foundation of ACT (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001). From an RFT perspective, values are important vehicles for behavior 
change. 
Relational Frame Theory 
 Relational Frame Theory was first proposed in 1985 and (RFT; Hayes et al., 
2001) has contributed substantially to the empirical literature in a relatively short amount 
of time, with over 60 published empirical papers on RFT principles before 2010 
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(Dymond, May, Munnely, & Hoon, 2010). RFT provides a comprehensive psychological 
and behavioral analytic account of language and higher cognition (Hayes Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 2012) and has been applied in domains outside of ACT, including special 
education (Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2001), and for psychotherapy in general 
(Törneke, 2010). Instead of examining the products of language (e.g. the structure and 
content of language) as is performed in the field of linguistics, RFT examines the activity 
of language and cognition. RFT is also the basic science theory that serves as the 
foundation for ACT therapy, and it provides a comprehensive account of the process by 
which ACT values procedures can lead to valued life engagement (Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
 Values are considered verbal behaviors, or arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding (AARR). According to RFT, verbal behaviors include both the learned acts of 
relating objects and concepts in arbitrarily applicable ways that are symbolic as well as 
responding to these relations (Hayes et al., 2001). The term, arbitrarily applicable, means 
that the behavior of relating is not based on any formal properties in the physical world, 
and thus, the nature of relations between concepts and objects can be changed based 
solely on the desires or preferences of the verbal community.  
 Three features characterize AARR and are the basic components of RFT: mutual 
entailment, combinatorial entailment, and transformation of stimulus functions. Mutual 
entailment describes the behavior of relating stimulus B to stimulus A when only the 
relationship of A to B was directly trained. In other words, training a relationship 
between A and B entails a relationship in the opposite direction, between B and A. For 
example, if I teach a person that the words ‘bloop’ and ‘lime’ are functionally equivalent, 
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that person may derive the reverse relationship: that ‘lime’ is functionally equivalent to 
‘bloop.’ Combinatorial entailment involves relating stimulus A to C when only the 
relationships of A to B and B to C were directly trained. These three steps can be 
illustrated with the following example. Suppose I trained a person that the words ‘bloop’ 
and ‘lime’ have equivalent functions. Next, I train that the spoken word ‘lime’ represents 
an actual lime. Without training, verbal beings will derive from those two relationships 
an additional relationship between the physical lime and the word ‘bloop’. This is 
combinatorial entailment. A verbal being will know that the lime and the ‘bloop’ are 
related despite having never been directly trained in this relationship. Lastly, 
transformation of stimulus functions describes how ‘bloop’ now acquires functions of 
‘lime’ and the physical object of a lime. In fact, on mere presentation of the word ‘bloop,’ 
previously conditioned responses to tasting an actual lime, such as salivation or 
puckering, may occur (Hayes et al., 2001; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012).  
 A specific class of an AARR is a relational frame, which is a unit of relational 
responding, and involves relations of concepts (e.g., frames of sameness, similarity, 
opposition, temporal situation, causality, etc.). As there are many ways in which stimulus 
events may be related, there are also many specific kinds of frames. Mutual entailment, 
combinatorial entailment, and the transformation of stimulus function are properties of a 
relational frame (Hayes, et al., 2001). For example, the use of the word “apple” may 
participate in a relational frame of similarity with “pear” and other specific fruits. In this 
way, arbitrary words become related to non-arbitrary stimuli in the environment and 
come to elicit behavioral responses that resemble responses to actual physical stimuli (as 
in the example of the ‘bloop’ and the lime).  
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Through this process, new behaviors can become reinforced through the 
construction of verbal statements alone, without any direct experience with the non-
verbal consequences of such a behavior. For example, “Dirty water is not drinking 
water,” could prevent a person from drinking water with a crumb floating in it, even if a 
person has never directly experienced consequences from drinking “dirty” water. 
Refusing to drink the water would be an example of rule-governed behavior, which is 
behavior that is under the control of verbal statements as opposed to direct experience of 
contingencies (Hayes et al., 1986).  
 Values as Rule-Governed Behavior. As words become associated with objects and 
occurrences and relations are trained and derived between them, the verbal construction 
of future events that have never been directly trained also becomes possible. This can 
allow for what we might call “imagining,” or future thinking. This is the process by 
which goals and values can be constructed. While goals and values are concepts that have 
commonalities, there are important differences between them. According to RFT, goals 
are terminal and can be reached, whereas values are ongoing and do not have a specified 
endpoint. Values are “…verbally-constructed, globally-desired life directions. Values 
manifest themselves over time and unfold as an ongoing process rather than an outcome” 
(Hayes et al., 2001, p. 235).  
 Values work in therapy is believed to work by augmenting a client’s motivation1 
to engage in values-oriented behaviors, increasing the likelihood for values engagement. 
Augmenting is rule-governed behavior that changes the extent to which an event will 
                                                 
1 From an RFT perspective, motivation does not refer to the process of going from a passive unmotivated 
state to an active or motivated state. In the current paper, the term “motivation,” refers to a process by 
which related actions that have been previously reinforced temporarily acquire additional reinforcing 
properties. 
 16 
function as a consequence. It provides verbally-formulated incentives for engaging in 
particular behaviors and explains the process by which values identification and 
clarification can motivate behavior. There are two subtypes of augmenting: formative and 
motivative. Formative augmentals establish new consequences (Hayes et al., 2012). For 
instance, imagine an individual stating that she values physical health. She then learns 
about a food she has never tried, kale, that has been called “healthy.” Learning that eating 
kale is related to her value of physical health may thus establish reinforcement for eating 
it. Motivative augmentals temporarily alter the reinforcement for behaviors for which a 
history of reinforcement exists. Having a history of engagement in behaviors, particularly 
those with reinforcing or punishing consequences, allows the sensory and perceptual 
consequences of engaging in those actions to be brought to awareness when merely 
speaking about them or thinking of them (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, asking an 
individual to explain why they value their relationship with their spouse gives rise to the 
consequences of doing just that (e.g., feeling happy, feeling connected to the spouse) in 
the present moment via the transformation of stimulus functions. This process is 
associated with the augmentation of reinforcement for engaging in instrumental behavior 
associated with spending time with the spouse. In other words, as a result of thinking 
about or talking about values, values-oriented behaviors that have been reinforced in the 
past become temporarily more reinforcing. In RFT, the behavior of clarifying one’s 
values also involves motivative augmenting, or “…behavior due to relational networks 
that temporarily alters the degree to which previously established consequences function 
as reinforcers or punishers…” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 109). In this way, values 
clarification can be understood as a motivational procedure in treatment. 
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 Pliance is one potential factor that can undermine the motivational power of 
values work in therapy. Pliance is rule-governed behavior based on a history of socially-
mediated reinforcement for following a rule (Hayes et al., 1986). It involves engaging in 
behaviors to achieve some social consequence (e.g., to please or displease someone else). 
An example would be a woman who reports valuing her career, not because she feels it is 
personally meaningful—she feels trapped and uninterested—but because her family 
would be disappointed if she changed careers. Pliance can become problematic as 
behaviors come under the control of others’ desires and opinions (e.g., the therapist, the 
wider culture, etc.), decreasing sensitivity to consequences in the natural environment. A 
potential pitfall of pliance is that it can reduce flexibility in behavior, as reinforcement is 
solely derived from following a socially-mediated rule that, by its very nature, is concrete 
and unchanging (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Behaviors may persist despite 
direct experience of harmful consequences, potentially leading to suffering. In contrast, 
engaging in values-oriented behaviors that are intrinsically reinforcing and not directed 
toward pleasing or displeasing others allows individuals to gain direct experience with 
the changing environment and associated consequences for behavior. As such, valued 
actions allow for flexible adjustments of behavior and more access to reinforcers. For 
example, “You should regularly visit sick relatives,” as a rule, could lead someone to 
visit a sick relative even when this relative does not want to be visited. The consequence 
of pliance often involves experiencing more frequent aversive consequences, and feeling 
trapped in such a pattern. In comparison, valuing kind and loving treatment of family 
members may lead an individual to initially visit a sick relative to express care, yet upon 
learning of the relative’s preference to be left alone, may consider fewer visitations. This 
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values-oriented behavior of visiting less in service of values would be considered 
tracking. Tracking is rule-governed behavior that, compared to pliance, allows for greater 
access to a variety of reinforcement contingencies by increasing opportunities for flexible 
behavior. 
 Coherence. One basic assumption of RFT is coherence, or sense making. It is 
believed that language-able humans engage in AARR in ways that are coherent, or make 
sense, because it has been reinforced previously, and this reinforcement has generalized 
such that maintaining coherent relational networks is reinforcing in the absence of 
external reinforcement. Under a host of different terms, the human behavior of sense 
making has been substantially discussed and observed in the psychological literature (see 
Bordlieri, 2013). 
 Coherence can be described as “inherently,” “intrinsically,” or “automatically” 
reinforcing, meaning that in the absence of external reinforcement for behaviors, a 
preference is still shown toward alignment of verbal behavior in ways that make sense. 
This is not to suggest that the reinforcing properties of coherence were not learned 
(Hayes et al., 2001). According to RFT, the preference for coherence is learned through 
behavioral contingencies in the verbal community as well as the natural environment. 
The verbal community, consisting of the many people that may interact verbally with an 
individual, reliably reinforces verbal behavior that is sensible and accurate (Hayes et al., 
2001). In addition to the social environment, the natural environment also reinforces 
verbal sense making. Driving safely involves following verbal rules that make sense. 
“Don’t speed, or else…” protects the driver from aversive consequences such as deadly 
accidents or speeding tickets that may never have been directly experienced. In this case, 
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making the reasonable decision to drive safely will be reinforced as the driver avoids 
accidents and speeding tickets. The social and natural contexts also punish inconsistency. 
For example, if an individual is asked why she slept late and replied, “It’s because I like 
muffins,” not only is it unlikely that such a response would be reinforced, but it is highly 
likely that it would be punished. 
 Another form of making sense involves the composition of our self-
conceptualizations. Inconsistency between what a person says and what a person does in 
a social context typically results in unfavorable social consequences. Being called a 
‘hypocrite,’ or ‘two-faced,’ are painful social consequences, and this is true even when 
the person waging these insults is oneself. Personal awareness of inconsistency alone can 
bring about emotional discomfort through the transformation of stimulus functions in 
which the words themselves carry the function of the social castigation that can 
accompany them. This aversive feeling that accompanies incoherence has been well 
documented in the social psychology literature as a state of tension, or an unsettled 
feeling that often coincides with noticing a discrepancy between behaviors and beliefs or 
attitudes (Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009).  
 Making sense is a fundamental component of verbal behavior. Over time, 
coherence, having been reliably reinforced across multiple social and natural contexts, 
generalizes to contexts in which it was not directly trained (Hayes et a., 2001). In terms 
of values, “I value healthy living,” and “I smoke,” may seem incoherent to the individual 
who has learned that smoking is not healthy. Having made these two statements, 
coherence may be regained with, “I will quit smoking,” and eventually, “I have quit 
smoking.” It can also be achieved with, “I don’t value healthy living all that much.”  
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 Despite strong empirical support for the basic tenets of RFT (Dymond et al., 
2010), there is limited support within the RFT literature for the concept of coherence. 
However, preliminary evidence exists for the reinforcing properties of coherence 
(Bordlieri, 2013; Wray, Dougher, Hamilton, & Guinther, 2012). Wray et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that individuals preferred solvable tasks to unsolvable tasks despite 
equivalent feedback for engaging in each of the tasks. Others have found that in the 
absence of experimentally programmed contingencies or instructions, individuals 
responded to stimuli in ways that were coherent and internally consistent (Bordlieri, 
2013; Harrison & Green, 1990). Evidence also exists from other research domains that 
support the concept of coherence, showing that individuals have a preference for 
consistent self-conceptualizations.  
Social Psychological Studies of Coherence and Values 
Scientific evidence across theoretical domains and over the course of several 
decades also has confirmed that exploring and identifying one’s personal values can 
affect behavior and motivation (see Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Epton et al., 2014; Harris & 
Epton, 2009; Pezza, 1991; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012; Rokeach & 
McLellan, 1972). Many of these studies come from the social psychology literature, and 
particularly from studies on cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance has been defined 
as the sense of distress experienced when individuals become aware of inconsistencies 
between beliefs, values, attitudes, and/or behaviors (Festinger, 1957). There are over 
1,000 studies supporting the principle of cognitive dissonance, showing that when 
individuals become aware that their behavior is inconsistent with their attitudes, they are 
likely to adjust attitudes or behaviors (Tavris & Aronson, 2015; Stone, 2012). These 
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findings are in accordance with an RFT account of coherence: when encountered with 
inconsistencies between attitudes, beliefs, values, behaviors, and any combination of 
these, individuals are compelled to restore consistency between them. Attempts to restore 
consistency typically involve changing part of the relational network, such as a belief, 
value, attitude or behavior. However, this does not always occur. Using self-report 
measures, several studies have indicated that the experience of cognitive dissonance is 
aversive (for a review, see Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-Jones, 2009) and that 
cognitive dissonance can be measured physiologically as arousal (Croyle & Cooper, 
1983). However, by escaping the tension associated with dissonance (or incoherence), 
individuals can avoid aversive feelings. Distraction, consuming alcohol, misattributing 
discomfort to a different source, trivializing the importance of a discrepant act, denying 
responsibility for one’s behavior, and focusing on unrelated positive attributes can reduce 
dissonance-based discomfort (Stone, 2012). These studies demonstrated that incoherence 
can lead to a variety of different behavioral responses. 
 Specific experimental procedures used to induce dissonance have also been 
shown to influence the behavioral means by which people attempt to resolve it (e.g., by 
changing values, changing behaviors, changing attitudes, avoiding, etc). Evidence 
suggests that in dissonance-based hypocrisy paradigms in which individuals advocate for 
certain values or beliefs and are then reminded of past value-behavior inconsistencies, 
people are more likely to reduce dissonance by adapting their behaviors (Freijy & Kothe, 
2013; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Hypocrisy paradigms are effective agents for both non-
health and health-related changes in attitudes and behavior (Freijy & Kothe, 2013; Stone 
& Fernandez, 2008). In one famous study of a hypocrisy paradigm by Aronson and Stone 
 22 
(1991) students were first asked to disclose their personal neglect of condom use and 
were then asked to make a statement persuading others to use condoms. Relative to the 
control condition, participants in the hypocrisy group were more likely to express intent 
to improve condom use in the future.  
 In another study (Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984), researchers recruited 
homeowners who expressed positive attitudes toward electricity conservation and agreed 
to have their electricity usage monitored for two weeks; a baseline measure of energy 
consumption was taken. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions: dissonance plus feedback plus conservation tips, feedback plus conservation 
tips, tips only, and lastly control. All experimental groups received tips for energy 
conservation. The dissonance group received letters in the mail reminding them that they 
had previously said they believed in conservation and that their energy use was high. The 
feedback group was only told that their usage was high. The tips only group received 
only the energy conservation tips. The control group was sent a thank you note for 
participating in the study. Energy consumption was recorded at two and four weeks. 
Results showed that participants in the dissonance condition used significantly less 
electricity compared to all conditions at two weeks. At four weeks, energy usage in the 
dissonance group was only significantly lower than the control group. Aitken, McMahon, 
Wearing, and Finlayson (1994) conducted a similar study in which participants were 
reminded of their concern for water conservation after being told that their water 
consumption was high. Participants in the dissonance condition conserved more water 
over the seven-week follow up than those in the control condition.  
 Another classic dissonance-based values procedure is Rokeach’s values self-
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confrontation method of behavior change (Rokeach, 1973). In this procedure, a person is 
first asked to rank order his or her values in order of importance. Then, the researcher 
informs the respondent about how their value priorities compared to both a negative 
reference group and a positive reference group. For example, a person may feel that being 
tolerant is consistent with his morality. After ranking values and placing the value of 
freedom above the value of equality, a researcher informs the individual that this specific 
value prioritization of freedom above equality resembles the value pattern of “bigots.” 
Next, the individual is provided with a list of value priorities that are consistent with 
individuals who are more “tolerant.” It is believed that in this procedure, providing 
information about a person’s value profile that conflicts with his or her ideal self-image 
creates dissonance. In response to this dissonance induction, individuals are then asked to 
re-order their values to align their priorities with those of the reference group that reflects 
their values. It is believed that individuals then modify values-related attitudes to 
conform to the new prioritization, and lastly, this will lead to changes in behaviors. In the 
example above, Rokeach assumed that reordering values such that equality was ranked 
higher than freedom should lead to changes in attitudes toward civil rights and voting 
behaviors (as cited in Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988). While there have been several 
studies to show that the values self-confrontation procedures indeed work in changing 
behaviors (Greenstein, 1976; Grube, Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Schwartz & Inbar-
Saban, 1988), the theoretically proposed mechanism of change, alterations in value 
priorities, has not been empirically demonstrated (Grube, Greenstein, Rankin, & Keaney, 
1982; Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988). 
ACT Values Procedures 
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 In ACT, therapists help clients identify and clarify their values, focusing clients 
toward valued patterns of engagement as an alternative to experiential avoidance. ACT 
assumes that all clients have the potential to connect with what is meaningful in their 
lives, and yet it can be difficult to have a clear sense of what is meaningful when fusion 
to thoughts and experiential avoidance lead people in contradictory directions. For 
instance, it is difficult to engage in behavior that is oriented toward the value of fostering 
close relationships while also avoiding emotional discomfort. In part, this is true because 
relationships typically require empathy, or contact with the range of others’ emotional 
experiences, and not just the comfortable ones. However, even if empathy can be 
avoided, the mere act of fostering relationships introduces the pain of losing the loved 
one as a result of the relationship ending, due to conflict or death, not to mention the pain 
of imagining this loss. In this way, when behavior is oriented toward a goal of emotional 
control, committed engagement with valued life activities becomes nearly impossible. To 
increase valued engagement, ACT guides clients through the identification and 
clarification of chosen values that can motivate valued behaviors, even when doing so 
involves psychological pain (Hayes et al., 2012).  
Methods for Values Identification 
ACT researchers and clinicians have developed several methods for identifying 
values for utilization in both research and practice. These assessments involve helping the 
client to identify the importance of several personal values domains. While there is no 
single recommended way to clarify values in ACT, common patterns have emerged 
within the ACT tradition. Values identification, in therapy, involves the assessment of 
patterns and qualities of actions in life domains that are important. During values 
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assessment, ACT clinicians also monitor carefully for pliance, often iterating to clients 
that values are freely chosen and do not function to please others or to avoid punishment. 
Values are chosen because they are personally meaningful.  
 A popular and additional step to the process of identification and clarification of 
values has also been used in treatment. This step involves bringing clients’ attention to 
how consistently their behaviors have reflected the importance of their values within a 
recent period of time (e.g., one week). For example, one popular clinical technique used 
in ACT is the Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ, Wilson et al., 2010), a self-report 
questionnaire in which respondents rank the importance of specified value domains (e.g., 
family, religion, career, etc.) and are subsequently asked to rank how consistently their 
behaviors have aligned with their values over the past week. Another ACT exercise, the 
Bulls-Eye Values Survey (Lundgren et al., 2012), involves a drawing of a Bulls-Eye in 
which the center of the target represents a client’s identified value. Clients are then asked 
to place a mark on the drawing to indicate how “on target” behavior has been with the 
value—greater consistency between values and behaviors will result in marks closer to 
the center of the Bulls-Eye. In this exercise, clients are then asked to mark on another 
Bulls-Eye how often they persist in values-related behaviors despite obstacles; the center 
of the Bulls-Eye, in this case, represents persistence despite all obstacles. In each of these 
procedures, a lack of connection between values and past behaviors is brought to 
attention. While empirical evidence has supported the theoretical position that 
identification and clarification of values can lead to behavior change, one question that 
has not been investigated, within the ACT literature, is whether the procedure of bringing 
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awareness to a lack of connection between values and behaviors could further affect 
motivation to engage in values-consistent behaviors.  
Consideration of Procedural Effects 
 In the case of values procedures that bring clients into contact with values-
behavior inconsistencies, the RFT principle of coherence may be relevant to behavioral 
outcome. The auxiliary procedure of having people rate values-behavior consistency 
brings client awareness to inconsistencies between the conceptualized self and recent 
behaviors. Whereas the basic procedure of identifying and clarifying values may produce 
various feelings including the positive experience of imagining valued engagement, the 
added procedure of rating values-behavior consistency introduces incoherence. With 
incoherence, individuals experience a state of emotional discomfort that has generalized 
from historical instances in which incoherence was met with social punishment. For this 
reason, values procedures with and without an assessment of values-behavior consistency 
may work differentially for individuals depending on their level of attachment to negative 
self-concepts, as well as experiential avoidance and psychological flexibility.  
 Fusion to Negative Self-Concepts. Having an overly negative and/or rigid self-
concept may affect the way clients respond to values work (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 
2012). Upon becoming aware of inconsistency between how much one values something 
and how little they have been engaging in valued behaviors, an individual is likely to re-
establish a coherent conceptualized self in one of two ways: by re-establishing coherence 
via thoughts (verbal behavior) or overt behavior. The first pathway to re-establishing 
coherence involves relating this information to negative thoughts, such as “I don’t do 
what I say I will do,” or, “I’m bad,” or “I can’t do this.” Individuals with a more rigid and 
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negative self-concept, upon noticing value/behavior inconsistencies, can regain coherence 
by relating the discrepancy to rigid and negative aspects of the conceptualized self. Thus, 
the individual’s focus has shifted away from changing behavior (e.g., spending more time 
with family) and coherence is instead achieved by relating this information to a negative 
thought about the self. For example, “I won’t spend more time with family because I’m 
selfish,” or “I’m a bad person.” In this way, coherence, with a long history of 
reinforcement across multiple contexts, is likely to be sought despite the aversive 
experience of identifying painful thoughts about oneself. 
 Conversely, it would be expected that an individual with a flexible and/or more 
positive self-concept would, in response to becoming aware of inconsistency between 
values and behaviors, proceed to regain coherence by changing behavior. As the 
believability of negative self-concepts is doubted, the ability to regain coherence by 
identifying with one’s self-concept is undermined. This leaves two possibilities for 
achieving coherence: altering the degree to which one cares about a value or changing 
one’s behaviors. Provided the extensive history of reinforcement associated with one’s 
personal values, it is unlikely, although not impossible, that the importance of the value 
itself will change. Changing behavior in respect to values does not require alteration to 
the relational network, which is relatively resistant to change.  
 Experiential Avoidance/Psychological Flexibility. Becoming aware of 
inconsistencies between one’s behavior and their self-conceptualization is likely to evoke 
emotional discomfort. One response to this discomfort would be experiential avoidance, 
which can take the form of suppressing discomfort, shifting attention away from the 
emotions through distraction, or engaging in a number of other strategies to avoid the 
 28 
aversive experience. When experiencing the discomfort of incoherence, individuals who 
are high in emotional avoidance would be likely to use distraction, thought suppression, 
or other avoidance techniques to avoid or escape the emotional discomfort (Stone, 2012). 
For individuals high in experiential avoidance, values procedures that highlight 
incoherence may temporarily result in less engagement in the task and/or emotional 
dysregulation, and thus individuals high in experiential avoidance may also be less likely 
to orient to change behaviors. Conversely, individuals who are more accepting of 
emotional experience may be more likely to engage in behavior change to re-establish 
coherence. For individuals who are open to experiencing emotions and have flexible 
or/and positive self-concepts, incoherence may be experienced as a signal to do 
something about the problem, thus increasing the likelihood of behavior change.  
Overview and Purpose  
  To date, there are no known studies of the behavioral effects of adding a values-
behavior consistency procedure to standard values identification and clarification 
procedures. There is reason to believe that this adjunctive procedure could increase the 
likelihood of engagement in values-oriented behaviors, and that the effectiveness of 
procedures may also vary according to the degree to which people rely on experiential 
avoidance for coping with emotional discomfort and how fused people are to negative 
self-conceptualizations. 
 The following study was a T1 translational study. Translational studies involve 
research for which scientific findings are applicable to clinical practice with clients. In 
other words, translational research findings bear directly on practical application, moving 
findings from “bench to bedside” (Rubio et al., 2010, p. 4). T1 translational research, 
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more specifically, is basic research aimed at informing clinical practice (Rubio et al., 
2010). Findings from the proposed study may be used to inform the utility of specific 
ACT values clarification practices in treatment. 
 The present research had three main goals. The first was to determine whether 
values exercises, in general, perform their intended function in ACT: to increase 
engagement in values-related behavior change. The second goal was to determine the 
effectiveness of adding values-behavior consistency procedures to a standard values 
clarification procedure. Lastly, I wanted to examine whether experiential avoidance and 
fusion to negative self-concepts moderate the effectiveness of approaches to values-
clarification. 
Hypotheses 
1. A values procedure with an added assessment of values-behavior consistency 
would be associated with increased engagement in values-oriented behavior 
compared to a basic values procedure, whereas both values procedures would be 
more effective than an attentional control condition. 
2. The relative effectiveness of the two values procedures would depend on levels of 
experiential avoidance and fusion to negative self-concepts. Values with 
behavioral values-behavior consistency assessment procedures would be expected 
to increase values-oriented behaviors for individuals who have lower experiential 
avoidance and less fusion to negative self-concepts, whereas a basic values 
clarification procedure would be expected to increase values-oriented behaviors 
for individuals who have higher experiential avoidance and more fusion to 
negative self-concepts. 
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3. In an exploratory analysis, I would examine the role of changes in affect from 
pre- to post-values interventions in motivating values-oriented behaviors.  
Method 
Eligibility Screen 
 Individuals who elected to participate were administered an initial screening 
assessment of age eligibility, appropriateness of the electronic device participants were 
using, the noise level in the workers’ environment, and an attention check item. 
Participants were compensated $.05 for completing the screening portion of the study. 
Participants 
 Participants were 356 adult Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers. Amazon 
MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform where people can elect to perform tasks, 
called Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), and earn money for their work. Buhrmester and 
colleagues (2011) showed that data obtained in social science studies on Amazon MTurk 
were at least as reliable as data obtained using traditional in-person study procedures. 
Adding to these findings, Hauser & Schwartz (2016) found that MTurkers paid closer 
attention to study instructions compared to college student populations.  For this study, I 
recruited only MTurk workers that were working within the United States and who had a 
98% or higher HIT approval rating, meaning that 98% or more of their work had been 
approved by employers (HIT requesters). Participants were compensated $.05 for 
completing the initial screening portion of the study (N = 356). Individuals that passed 
the screen had to be 18 years old or older, participating from a laptop or desktop 
computer, working in an environment with no more than light noise, and accurately 
respond to the attention check item. Those who were eligible to participate in the 
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remainder of the study (N = 314) had the opportunity to earn an additional $2.95 for 
completing at least 95% of all study items and providing accurate, effortful responses to 
items as measured by attention check items and visual inspection of the experimental 
writing portion of the study. Two workers were not paid for failing to meet minimum 
completion requirements.  
Recruitment 
 The study advertisement (Appendix A) that was listed on MTurk was titled, 
“Psychological study on values and emotions; Earn up to $3.00 if you qualify.” 
Prospective participants who chose to preview the HIT were presented with information 
about eligibility, compensation, the amount of time required to participate, and were 
warned that evidence of falsified or misleading data would lead to rejection of work. The 
ad also stated, “This study will involve several questions about your emotions, beliefs, 
and thoughts, and will also involve a task in which you will write continuously about a 
topic for a few minutes at a time.”  
Procedure 
 See Figure 2 for an overview of the main study procedures. Participants were 
routed from the MTurk website to an online survey created in Qualtrics, an internet-based 
program for survey design and data collection. Participants first read the informed 
consent and were offered the opportunity to continue the study. Then, participants  
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completed the screening portion of the study. Those who met inclusion criteria then 
completed a measure of affect. Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned using 
block randomization to one of three dose-equivalent study conditions: an attentional 
control group, simple values procedure, or a values procedure with an added values-
behavior consistency procedure. After completing the experimental portion of the study, 
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a second administration of the measure of affect was presented, followed by an 
opportunity to donate up to $2.95 of their study earnings to one or more of 13 different 
charities. Following the donation opportunity, participants completed an assessment of 
fusion to negative self-statements, experiential avoidance, a post-participation survey, 
and then a demographic assessment. Participants were thanked for their participation.  
Two attention check questions were inserted into the study with the aim of 
increasing the validity of obtained data. The first one assessed that participants read 
instructions to the writing portion of the study; participants were corrected if they failed 
this assessment and were assessed a second time for comprehension of writing 
instructions. The next attention check item was imbedded at the end of the second mood 
measure and asked participants to “leave blank.” These items served to further assess 
participant engagement, comprehension, and effort as these were important to the validity 
of findings. The placement of these items was aimed to prevent interference with the 
experimental task as well as minimize any influence on mood. 
Materials 
Demographics. To explore sample characteristics, I assessed participants’ 
gender, age, ethnic/racial identification, income, and education level (see Appendix B for 
demographic instrument). 
 Experiential Avoidance. The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; 
Bond et al., 2011) is a 7-item self-report inventory measuring the willingness to accept 
private events (e.g., emotions, thoughts, or sensations). In this study, it demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency (α = .94). Scores are the sum of item responses; higher 
scores indicate greater experiential avoidance and/or psychological inflexibility, whereas 
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lower scores indicate greater experiential acceptance and/or psychological flexibility. 
Average total scale score in this sample was M = 21.48, SD = 10.50. The AAQ-II 
maintains a high correlation (r = .97) with the AAQ-I and has improved psychometric 
consistency over the original measure. It has demonstrated convergent and criterion-
related validity (see Appendix C for AAQ-II).  
 Fusion to Negative Self-Thoughts. The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 30-item questionnaire measuring the frequency and 
of automatic negative self-statements. It was revised by Zettle and Hayes (1986) to 
include a measure of the believability of thoughts (ATQ-B). In the ATQ-B, frequency 
and believability are scored separately by obtaining sums of responses to each. High 
scores for frequency indicate higher levels of negative automatic thoughts; high scores 
for believability indicate more attachment to negative self-statements. Hollon and Kendal 
(1980) previously reported excellent internal consistency (α = .97) for this scale. In the 
current study, internal reliability for the ATQ-B was also excellent ( = .98). with 
average scores of M = 65.32, SD = 28.91. 
 Negative Affect. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a widely used 20-item measure of mood consisting of 10 
positive and 10 negative affect items, each linked to a 5 point Likert scale. Reliability for 
both the positive and negative affect is good, with α = .86-.90 and α = .84-.87, 
respectively. The following items were added to the negative affect scale: 
disappointment, dissatisfaction, frustrated, embarrassed, fear, resentment, guilt, self-
contempt, uneasiness, threatened (see Appendix E for PANAS with added items). In this 
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sample, internal consistency for pre-randomization negative affect ( = .95), and post-
randomization negative affect ( = .95) were excellent.  
 Randomization to Conditions. Participants were randomly assigned using block 
randomization to one of three groups: Control, Values-Alone, and Values with Behavior-
Consistency.  
 Control. An attentional control group is included in the experimental design and 
provides participants with similar duration and intensity of participation requirements as 
the experimental conditions, but without the procedural components that are 
hypothesized to be active. In this condition, participants responded to two prompts about 
time management. The first prompt (Appendix F) asked participants to choose a time 
management practice from a list of practices that are valued by society. The list included 
the following: staying organized; planning ahead; making commitments you can keep 
(not over-committing); keeping a schedule; working steadily toward deadlines; setting 
goals; keeping a routine, and maintaining work-life balance. They were then asked to 
write continuously about why the practice they selected from the list is valued and how 
people might implement it. Participants had 4 minutes in which to write their response. 
After 4 minutes, the questionnaire advanced to another page asking participants to choose 
another time management practice from the same list and write about why people value 
the second practice and how it can be implemented. After 4 minutes, the page 
automatically advanced. 
 Participants were then presented with the following item: “Please respond to each 
statement by rating how true each statement is for you according to your own personal 
sense of what is important about time management, on a scale of 1 (not at all true) to 7 
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(extremely true).” The list of items will contain the following: “It is important to be on 
time.” “It is important to have a set routine every day.” “I care about planning. “It is 
important to me to take on only as much as I can handle.”  
 Values-Alone. Participants in the Values-Alone condition (VA) were asked to 
write responses to two prompts. The first prompt (Appendix G) asked participants to 
select one of the following issues that “…moves you to want to take action and help 
people in that situation.” The list included the following possible selections: 
Hunger/famine, poverty, discrimination, disease, substance abuse, mental health 
problems, child abuse or neglect, and veteran’s issues. Participants were then asked to, 
“…tell us more about why this specific human issue matters to you. What you write may 
be personal, about people you know, or it may be general information about the issue. All 
of this is acceptable as long as it tells us why you care about this issue.”  They were 
instructed to write continuously until the page advanced in 4 minutes. After 4 minutes, 
the page advanced to the next writing prompt.  
 The second writing prompt (Appendix H) asked participants to write about how 
they choose to express their care/concern for the human issues they feel are most 
important. The term ‘express’ is defined in the prompt as:  
“…expressing through your actions. There are countless ways you may have 
already done this or would like to do this. For example, some people may express 
their care/concern about discrimination by working hard to treat people as equals 
and voting in ways that they believe reflect this concern. Another person who 
cares about colon cancer may create posts in social media that raise awareness 
about the disease.”  
 
After 4 minutes, participants automatically advanced to the last section of the 
values condition (Appendix I) in which they were told the following:  
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“Below is a list of statements about actions that are often important to people that 
care about human issues, such as the issue you wrote about earlier. Please respond 
to each statement by rating how true each statement is for you according to your 
own personal sense of what is important, on a scale of 1 (Not At All True) to 7 
(Extremely True).” 
 
Statements included: “I care about getting involved in solutions to human 
problems,” “It is important to take care of people who are less fortunate,” “I care about 
giving to people who are in need,” and “It is important to me to try to make a difference 
in the lives of other people.” 
  Values with Behavior-Consistency. Participants in the Values with Behavior-
Consistency (VBC) condition responded to the entire values procedure described in the 
Values condition with the exception of writing for only 3 minutes for each essay to 
account for equivalence in dosage of time between conditions. Participants in the VBC 
condition were then presented with the following (Appendix J): 
 “We just asked you about how you express your care and concern for human 
issues through your actions. Now we want you to reflect on your activities over 
the past week. In our daily lives, it is common to feel pulled in different 
directions. Most of us find that as much as we deeply care about other humans, 
the daily events that fill our lives often distract us from living the way we want to 
and doing what matters most. Sometimes we may forget how much we care about 
important human issues as we struggle under the weight of the many activities 
that fill our days.  
 
 On the last page you responded to statements about a range of behaviors such as 
being generous, caring for others, volunteering, and trying to make a difference. 
Here, take a moment to reflect deeply on how much you have engaged in these 
actions over the past week. How consistent were your actions with how much you 
care about each of the behaviors in the list? Please rate the degree to which over 
the past week your actions matched how important these behaviors are to you, 
from 1-7, with 1 being “my actions were not at all consistent with how important 
this is to me,” to 7 being, “my actions were very consistent with how important 
this is to me.”  
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Items included: “Getting involved in solutions to human problems,” “Taking care 
of people who are less fortunate,” “Giving to people who are in need,” and, “Trying to 
make a difference in the lives of other people.”  
Dependent Variable 
Participants were presented with an opportunity to give a portion of their earnings 
(i.e., $0.00 to $2.95) to charity (see Appendix K). Thirteen charities were provided, and 
participants were able to type in the amount of donation they wanted to offer to each 
charity.  
Post-Participation Survey 
 Following the survey, the following questions about the participation experience 
were presented: “1. What do you think this study was about? 2. How did you feel about 
the donation opportunity? 3. Please tell us anything about your experience that you think 
the researchers should know, such as technical glitches, problems, etc.” Participants were 
able to enter free-response answers to these questions.  
Results 
Analytic Strategy and Data Screening 
 Prior to analysis, data was screened for validity and accuracy, missing values, and 
meeting the requisite assumptions of statistical analyses. Of the entire sample of MTurk 
workers that completed the study (N = 356), 314 participants passed the pre-screen and 
proceeded to participate in the remainder of the study. Of the remaining sample of 314 
completers, 68 cases were excluded from analysis for the following reasons: accurately 
guessing the dependent variable in the study (n = 15); providing written feedback 
indicating doubt about the validity of the dependent variable (n = 12); evidence that the 
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same person participated twice (n = 2); failing one or more attention check items in the 
study (n = 37); failing to complete the writing portion of the study as instructed (n = 1); 
and failing to complete minimum participation requirements (n = 1).  
Missing Data. Missing data was examined using a missing data analysis 
procedure available in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Altogether, ten 
individuals had incomplete data. Of these individuals, four were missing one response to 
an item on the AAQ and six were missing one response to an item on the PANAS. These 
data points appeared to be missing at random. Given the low number of missing data 
points, list-wise deletion was used to manage missing data in this sample (10 cases 
removed; N = 236). 
Outlier Analysis. I assessed for univariate outliers by inspecting box plots of 
independent variables and the dependent variable. There were univariate outliers 
observed for fusion, negative affect, and donation amount (see Appendices L, M, and N, 
and O for boxplots). However, no cases were removed, as outliers did not appear to be 
associated with measurement error or data entry error, and they appeared to reflect an 
accurate sampling of the true population.  
I then assessed for multivariate outliers by using a common procedure of 
examining the following indices (Osborne & Overbay, 2008): standardized residuals, 
leverage, and Cooks D. Indices were visually examined and compared to calculated 
cutoff points. For Cook’s D, the cutoff for outliers was 4/n-k-1; for leverage, the cutoff 
was 2(k/n); for standardized residuals, the cutoff was z = 3 or greater. For multivariate 
outlier analysis, comparison of indices with computed cutoff scores indicated that no 
cases met or exceeded cutoff points. Therefore, outlier analysis did not lead to the 
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exclusion of any cases from further analysis.  
Hurdle Regression. I used Hurdle Regression Analyses (HRA) to examine the 
influence of condition, fusion, experiential avoidance, and change in negative affect on 
whether or not participants donated and how much they donated. The HRA model was 
designed by Cragg (1971) to model data in which sequential decision-making processes 
were involved, such that the first decision results in a binary outcome and the second 
decision results in a positive amount (Frees, 2010). Cragg’s (1971) original model was 
applied to the sale of durable goods for which individuals either bought zero goods or a 
positive amount of goods. He conceptualized the decision of whether or not to buy and 
how much to buy as two different processes governed (potentially) by different factors. 
This model is also appropriate for data in this study, as individuals needed to first cross 
the “hurdle” of deciding whether or not to donate before making the decision of how 
much to donate. The first step in the model predicts the binary probability of donation. 
The second part of the model uses a zero-truncated exponential regression model to 
predict that donation amount for those individuals that crossed the ‘hurdle’ of deciding to 
donate. The model was zero-truncated because $0 donation is conceptualized as a refusal 
of the donation opportunity.  
Statistical Assumptions. In this study, values-oriented behavior was 
conceptualized as engagement in the donation opportunity, which was a discrete, 
dichotomous outcome. Statistical assumptions for binary logistic regression models 
include the following: the dependent variable must be dichotomous; variables must be 
independent; there must be a linear relationship between continuous independent 
variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable; and collinearity between 
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independent variables should be minimal.  
Assumptions regarding independence and binary outcome were met. To examine 
the relationship between the independent variable and the logit transformation of the 
dependent variable, a Box-Tidwell procedure (Box & Tidwell, 1962) was used. Results 
indicated that all variables were linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable. To 
examine collinearity, correlation matrices were examined for independent variables of 
fusion, experiential avoidance, and negative affect. There was one significant correlation 
between fusion and experiential avoidance (r = .72, p < .001). No other significant 
correlations were observed between changes in negative affect and fusion (r = .03, p = 
.65) or between changes in negative affect and experiential avoidance (r = .03, p = .70). 
The high correlation between fusion and experiential avoidance suggests that when both 
variables are included together in a regression model, interpretations regarding the 
influence of each variable on charitable giving should be made with caution (Vatcheva et 
al, 2016). Therefore, to examine the independent contribution of experiential avoidance 
and fusion, these variables were separated and run in additional hurdle regression models. 
Participants. Of the 246 participants who provided valid data, 116 (47%) self-
identified as women, 129 (53%) as men, and 1 (0.4%) as transgender. 198 (80%) self-
identified as White/non-Hispanic, 9 (4%) as African American, 22 (9%) as Asian, 11 
(4.4%) as Hispanic/Latino, 4 (2%) as other, and 1 (0.4%) participant left the 
race/ethnicity item blank. Ages ranged from 18 to 70 years old, with an average age of 36 
(SD = 11.3). Table 1 shows descriptive data for demographic characteristics by study 
condition.    
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Randomization. To examine the success of randomization, I compared groups on 
negative affect pre-randomization, as well as experiential avoidance and fusion. First, I 
assessed whether the data met preliminary assumptions for a one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVA). The distribution of negative affect scores, as well as standardized 
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residuals of negative affect were highly positively skewed in all three experimental 
conditions. No attempted transformations were able to successfully correct this. 
Therefore, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used. There were no differences between groups in 
negative affect pre-randomization, 2(2) = 0.29, p = .86. Fusion scores were also 
positively skewed and did not meet requirements for homogeneity of variance. Therefore, 
a Kruskal-Wallis test was used. There were no differences between groups in negative 
affect pre-randomization, 2(2) = 1.38, p = .50. For experiential avoidance, data met all 
requisite assumptions for an ANOVA. There were no differences between groups on 
experiential avoidance, with F(2, 235) = 0.41, p = .67. 
 
Donation. Out of 236 individuals included in analyses, 95 individuals (40%) 
chose to donate a portion of their earnings (see Figure 3). Among those that donated, the 
average donation amount was $0.84 (SD = 0.79, range 2.90). Including only the total 
donations or those who chose to donate, the VBC group donated an average of $0.92 
(median = 0.55, SD = 0.86, range = 2.90), the Values-Alone group donated an average of 
$0.82 (median = 0.50, SD = 0.77, range = 2.90), and the control group donated an 
average of $0.74 (median = 0.50, SD = 0.7, range = 2.90).  
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Tests of Hypotheses: The first hurdle regression compared both values groups 
against the control group and included all independent variables in the model (Table 3; N 
= 236). The second hurdle regression included all independent variables and compared 
the VBC and VA conditions directly (N = 160; Table 4.) Results revealed that assignment 
to either the VBC or VA condition increased the likelihood of donation compared to the 
control condition (b = 0.56, p = .01; and b = 0.58, p = .008, respectively). However, the 
likelihood of donation was not different between values conditions (b = -0.02, p = .91). 
Furthermore, for those individuals that chose to donate, there were no differences 
between conditions in the amount of earnings donated. 
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To examine the influence of fusion and experiential avoidance on donation, main 
effects of these variables were analyzed as well as their interactions with condition. No 
interactions were significant in either the first or second hurdle regression analysis. 
However, there were some main effects and trends worth noting. There was a trend 
toward significance for the main effect of experiential avoidance in predicting whether or 
not individuals chose to donate (b = -0.04, p = .07) when all conditions were in the 
model, with lower experiential avoidance being associated with a higher likelihood of 
choosing to donate. However, when only the VA and VBC conditions were included in 
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the model, there was no trend toward significance for the main effect of experiential 
avoidance predicting the decision to donate (b = -0.01, p = .51). 
 
When examining the influence of fusion and experiential avoidance on the 
amount of donation, there were significant main effects. When all conditions were 
included in the model, only fusion was a significant predictor of donation amount, with 
higher levels of fusion being associated with greater donation (b = 0.02, p = .02). When 
examining only the VA and VBC groups, both fusion and experiential avoidance 
predicted donation amounts. Higher levels of fusion were associated with greater 
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donation amounts and lower levels of experiential avoidance were also associated with 
greater donation amounts (b = .02, p = .006; b =  -0.06, p = .006, respectively). 
Post Hoc Analyses. To address the problem of high correlation between 
experiential avoidance and fusion (r = .72, p < .001) and the possibility that observed 
main effects for these variables were a statistical artifact of multicollinearity, I ran 
separate hurdle regressions for each of these independent variables. The first regression 
(n = 236) compared all three conditions and examined the impact of condition, 
experiential avoidance, group X experiential avoidance, and negative affect on donation. 
As was found previously, participants in the values conditions were significantly more 
likely to donate than individuals in the control condition, with b = 0.50, p = .02 for the 
VBC condition, and b = 0.55, p = .01 for the VA condition. There were no significant 
main effects or interaction effects for other variables in the model, and none of the 
predictors significantly predicted donation amount. The second regression (N = 236) 
compared all three conditions and examined the impact of condition, fusion, condition X 
fusion, and negative affect on donation. Again, only condition predicted whether or not 
people would choose to donate, with the VBC condition (b = 0.51, p = .02) and the VA 
condition (b = 0.52, p = .01) being more likely to choose to donate than the control 
condition. None of the predictors significantly predicted donation amount. 
Next, I ran hurdle regression analyses without the control condition (N = 160) to 
examine the comparative effects of the values groups as well as the separate relationships 
between experiential avoidance or fusion with donation. In these models, I also included 
the interaction between negative affect and condition to examine any differences between 
conditions in the role of negative affect on donation. The first model included condition, 
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experiential avoidance, negative affect, condition X experiential avoidance, and condition 
X negative affect (Table 5). No predictors in the model were significantly related to the 
choice to donate or the donation amount. 
 
There were, however, two trends toward significance. The first trend was 
observed in the interaction between condition and experiential avoidance predicting 
whether or not individuals chose to donate (b = .04, p = .08). The second trend was in the 
interaction between condition and experiential avoidance predicting the amount people 
donated (b = 0.04, p = .08). These trends suggested that experiential avoidance may be 
differentially related to decisions to donate and amount of donation depending on 
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whether individuals were assigned to the VA or VBC condition. However, experiential 
avoidance did not predict the amount of donation in the VA group, as the main effect for 
experiential avoidance was not significant (b = -0.02, p = .26). To examine the trends 
further, a follow-up Cragg hurdle regression was calculated containing the same variables 
as before, although with VBC and VA conditions reverse-coded. Results from the binary 
logistic regression revealed that the main effect for experiential avoidance in the VBC 
condition was also not significant (b = 0.02, p = .20) indicating that experiential 
avoidance did not independently predict the choice of whether or not to donate in the 
VBC group. In the zero-truncated exponential regression, the main effect for experiential 
avoidance was not significant indicating that experiential avoidance did not significantly 
predict how much people donated in the VBC condition (b = 0.02, p = .17). After 
reverse-coding, the interaction terms were again trending toward, but not reaching, 
significance, and with slopes in the opposite direction (b = -0.04, p = .08; b = -0.04, p = 
.08). These results suggest a possible trend toward differences between the VBC and VA 
groups in how experiential avoidance was associated with whether or not people donated 
and how much people donated.  
The second regression model included condition (VBC vs VA), fusion, negative 
affect, condition X fusion, and condition X negative affect (Table 6). In the binary 
logistic regression, the interaction between condition and fusion was significant (b = 
0.02, p = .02) suggesting that fusion was differentially related to the decision about 
whether or not to donate depending on condition. There were no significant findings in 
the zero-truncated exponential regression. Findings revealed fusion did not predict 
donation in the VA condition (b =-0.01, p = .27). However, I ran a subsequent binary 
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logistic regression to examine the relationship between fusion and donation in the VBC 
condition. For this purpose, the VBC and VA conditions were re-coded. Results indicated 
that higher levels of fusion predicted greater likelihood of donation in the VBC condition 
(b = .01, p = .02). Furthermore, the results indicated that the interaction was still 
significant, and in the opposite direction (b = -.02, p = .02).  
Exploratory Analyses. Cragg hurdle regression analyses revealed that changes in 
negative affect did not predict donation. To further explore the role of changes in mood 
as a result of condition, I tested assumptions to run a one-way analysis of variance. The 
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distribution of the residual scores for change in negative affect were leptokurtic, with 
kurtosis values > 2 for all groups. Therefore, the assumption of normality was not met. 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was also not met, as Levene’s statistic 
indicated significant differences between group variances (p < .001). Therefore, a 
nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test was performed. There were significant group 
differences in changes in negative affect, with 2(2) = 14.3, p < .001. 
To further examine pairwise differences between conditions, Mann-Whitney U 
tests were performed. Results revealed no differences between VBC and Values 
conditions (U = 3077.00, p = .44). Both the VBC and VA conditions were associated 
with greater increase in negative affect compared to the control group (U = 2083.5, p 
<.001; and U = 2368, p < .01, respectively; see Figure 4). Both the VBC and VA 
conditions were associated with an average increase of 0.18 per negative affect item on 
the PANAS (SD = 0.42 and 0.57, respectively) and an average increase of 3.2 on the sum 
score of negative affect items.  
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Summary of Results 
As expected, both values procedures were more effective at increasing the 
likelihood of engagement in valued action (i.e., charitable donation) than the attentional 
control condition. Individuals in both values conditions were more likely to donate a 
portion of their earnings than individuals in the control condition. However, contrary to 
expectations, the likelihood that individuals in the VBC condition would choose to 
engage in values-oriented behavior did not differ from the likelihood that individuals in 
the VA condition would engage in values-oriented behavior. In other words, the VBC 
conditions did not lead to a higher likelihood to donate compared to the VA condition.  
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Other unexpected results involved the hypothesized moderator variables: 
experiential avoidance and fusion. Multicollinearity observed between experiential 
avoidance and fusion caused problems with interpretation of their main effects and 
interactions within the initially proposed regression models. Therefore, to examine 
whether observed main effects in the proposed models were a statistical artifact of 
multicollinearity, separate analyses were performed. Separating these variables into 
different models revealed that the observed main effects in the initial analyses were 
indeed a statistical artifact of multicollinearity (Vatcheva, 2016). However, new 
relationships were revealed when the contributions of these independent variables were 
tested separately.  
Counter to expectations, experiential avoidance did not moderate the relationship 
between condition and decision to donate. However, a trend toward significant 
differences between the VBC and VA conditions was observed in the binary logistic 
regression, suggesting that the relationship between experiential avoidance and the 
decision about whether or not to donate may vary according to which values intervention 
was administered.  
I hypothesized that fusion would moderate the effectiveness of the values 
interventions. One important finding was that fusion indeed moderated the relationship 
between condition and decision to donate, but not in the hypothesized direction. Contrary 
to hypotheses, higher levels of fusion were associated with a higher likelihood of 
engagement in values oriented behavior (i.e., deciding to donate a portion of their 
earnings), but only in the VBC condition. Fusion was not associated with the likelihood 
of values-oriented action in the VA condition. This interaction is noteworthy, as there 
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were no significant differences in the likelihood for choosing to donate nor the amount 
donated between the VBC and VA conditions. This suggests that the VBC condition may 
work differentially for individuals depending on levels of fusion. It is also noteworthy 
that negative affect was not associated with decisions to donate, nor was the relationship 
between negative affect and donation different between conditions. This suggests that the 
relative effectiveness of condition depending on levels of fusion was not related to 
changes in negative affect. 
Exploratory analyses also revealed that for individuals who chose to donate, the 
level of engagement in valued action (i.e., the amount donated) was not predicted by 
condition nor hypothesized interactions (i.e., condition x fusion and condition x 
experiential avoidance), although there was a trend toward a significant interaction 
between experiential avoidance and donation amount, but only within the values 
conditions. In other words, there may be differences in how experiential avoidance relates 
to donation amount when comparing the VA and VBC conditions.  
Exploration also revealed that negative emotions did not influence whether 
individuals chose to donate nor how much they donated, despite findings that individuals 
in both values conditions experienced greater increases in negative emotion compared to 
the control condition. However, between the two values conditions, there were no 
differences in changes in negative affect.   
Discussion 
 Over the years, studies have shown that ACT interventions are effective at 
increasing engagement in valued behaviors and improving psychological well-being 
(Gloster et al., 2017; Powers, Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2010). As evidence for the ACT 
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model has grown, many scientists have begun to devote attention to evaluating the 
respective contribution of each component in the ACT model. While randomized 
controlled trials may be considered the ‘gold standard’ in treatment outcome research, 
component research is also important because it allows for the testing of theoretical 
hypotheses with a level of control that is often not possible in standard outcome research 
(Levin et al., 2012). Findings from component research thus far have shown that values 
are an integral element in the ACT model (Gloster et al., 2017), and there are several 
common therapeutic techniques for identifying clients’ values (Wilson et al., 2010; 
Lundgren at al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2012). At the time of this study, no experiments 
examining the relative effectiveness of different ACT values techniques had been 
conducted.  
Results from this study confirmed prior findings on the effectiveness of values 
interventions at increasing motivation to engage in valued behaviors (Freijy & Kothe, 
2013; Epton et al., 2014; Harris & Epton, 2009; Pezza, 1991; Levin et al., 2012; Rokeach 
& McLellan, 1972) while also contributing new findings to the literature. This study was 
unique in that it isolated the values component from other ACT treatment components 
and showed a direct relationship between identification of values and increases in values-
oriented behaviors using a behavioral measure of valued action. This may also be the first 
study to directly compare two values techniques to determine their comparative efficacy 
at increasing valued action.  
The adjunct procedure of assessing values-behavior consistency has been believed 
to confer additional benefits to a values procedure by increasing the likelihood of 
engagement in values-oriented behavior above a values-identification procedure alone 
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(Hayes et al., 2012). This study did not confirm any overall benefit of the adjunct 
procedure; both procedures performed similarly in regards to increasing engagement in 
values oriented behaviors. However, findings also suggested that higher fusion to 
negative self-statements was associated with increased engagement in values-oriented 
behaviors. This was contrary to expected findings.  
There is a great amount of evidence to suggest that perceived discrepancies 
between beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviors increases the likelihood that an individual 
will seek to establish consistency among them (Stone, 2012). It could make sense then 
that individuals, after becoming aware that their behaviors are not consistent with their 
values, might seek to re-establish coherence within their self-concepts through fusion 
with negative self-statements. Noticing inconsistency between one’s actions and values 
might elicit negative self-assessments such as, “I’m a bad person,” since incoherence is 
typically associated with a long history of social punishment. An individual who is 
particularly fused to the thought, “I’m a bad person,” could thus re-establish coherence 
between their observed behaviors and their understanding of themselves; someone who is 
less convinced of the truth of their negative self-statements might not re-establish 
coherence in this way. For the person with higher levels of fusion, re-establishing 
coherence in one’s self-concept would not depend on changing one’s behavior, and thus, 
it was believed that individuals with greater fusion would demonstrate less engagement in 
values-oriented behavior after discrepancies between their values and behaviors were 
brought to their awareness. However, the opposite relationship was found. Individuals 
with greater fusion were relatively more likely to engage in valued action when 
inconsistencies between their values and behaviors were brought to their awareness. 
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When inconsistencies were not brought to participants’ awareness, as in the simple values 
procedure, levels of fusion were inconsequential; they were not predictive of donation. 
Interestingly, both values procedures led to similar likelihood of values-oriented 
behavior.  
One explanation for this observed effect could be that individuals with greater 
fusion are more likely to engage in efforts to change unwanted thoughts about themselves 
than individuals with less fusion to negative self-statements. Individuals with higher 
levels of fusion are likely to relate to their thoughts as representative of truth (Hayes et 
al., 2012). Therefore, individuals with higher fusion might be more likely to attempt to 
change their negative thoughts about themselves by engaging in available opportunities 
to change their self-concepts.  
This finding brings forward important questions about how to optimally target 
values in ACT. While it appeared that the adjunct procedure was especially effective at 
increasing engagement in valued action for people with higher fusion, the simple values 
procedure was effective across individuals regardless of fusion levels. In other words, it 
is not clear that the adjunct procedure provides a distinct advantage over the simple 
procedure. Furthermore, there is still more to be understood about how values procedures 
work and how they interact with fusion and other core processes in the ACT model. 
Higher levels of cognitive fusion (Bardeen & Fergus, 2016) and fusion to negative self-
statements, specifically (Duff, Larsson, & McHugh, 2016), has been associated with 
higher levels of psychological distress. While increasing awareness of values-behavior 
discrepancies is particularly motivational for individuals with higher levels of fusion to 
negative self-statements, it is unclear to what extent values-oriented behaviors of this 
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nature would be associated with the therapeutic outcome of psychological flexibility. 
Instead, it is possible that values-consistent behaviors that are inspired by efforts to 
change one’s thoughts may lead to behavioral rigidity. For instance, in this study, 
individuals with greater fusion may have decided to donate in the VBC condition with the 
narrow aim of changing their negative thoughts that were elicited in the values-behavior 
discrepancy procedure. This narrow focus may have led to donation despite important 
reasons not to donate. According to ACT theory, fusion involves responding to language 
or thoughts as if the words themselves were their referents and could be observed in the 
natural environment (Hayes et al., 2012). In other words, “I am bad” feels real to the 
person who is fused with that thought. It is no wonder that for the person high in fusion, 
behavior consequent to the thought “I am bad” would be directed toward addressing the 
problem of ‘badness.’ By responding to the internal experience as though it is real and 
true, fusion is believed to be associated with lower awareness of environmental 
contingencies that might otherwise influence behavior (Hayes et al., 2012). Seeking to 
change a negative self-statement might direct attention inward where one is less likely to 
be sensitive to the real-world consequences of behavior. In contrast, a more 
psychologically flexible way of responding would involve noticing thoughts as ‘just 
thoughts,’ and observing whether the thought is useful toward engaging in life in a way 
that is consistent with what matters most to them. 
While observed inconsistencies between values and behaviors could lead to rigid 
behavioral attempts to ‘solve’ verbally constructed problems, it is important to note that 
the adjunct procedure was associated with engagement in behaviors that were indeed 
consistent with values.  However, it is unknown whether values engagement that is 
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motivated by attempts to change internal experiences would produce reinforcing 
consequences equivalent to behavior that was motivated by the mere choice to live in 
values-consistent ways. When individuals are attempting to change unwanted thoughts 
about themselves through engagement with values, this contingency can be understood 
within a context of aversive control. In such a context, the predominant experience after 
donation might be a form of relief that results after disconfirming a negative thought. It is 
possible then that these individuals would be less sensitive to the experience of rewarding 
consequences for congruence between values and behaviors as well as the rewards to be 
derived from the natural environment. These possibilities introduce important areas for 
further research regarding which values approach would be most conducive to progress 
toward psychological flexibility depending on the current psychological functioning of 
the client.  
An observed non-significant trend in the data suggested that experiential 
avoidance may be related to values-oriented behaviors depending on whether the adjunct 
values-behavior assessment is included in a values procedure. It would make sense that 
individuals who are attempting to change negative thoughts about themselves may also 
be attempting to avoid negative internal experiences associated with incoherence. Indeed, 
cognitive fusion has been shown to be positively associated with experiential avoidance 
(Gillanders et al., 2014; Bardeen & Fergus, 2016). In this study, a high correlation 
between experiential avoidance and fusion was also observed. For individuals with high 
levels of fusion and experiential avoidance, donation may have functioned to change both 
thoughts and feelings associated with incoherence. More research is needed to clarify 
how the interaction between values condition and experiential avoidance affects values-
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oriented behavior. While I did not assess whether there were changes in affect after the 
donation experience, this additional assessment would have provided useful information 
about the differential effects of donation for individuals depending on assigned condition, 
fusion to negative self-statements, and experiential avoidance. However, there was no 
observed correlation between changes in negative affect and experiential avoidance.  
Another interesting finding is that negative affect, which has been shown to be 
associated with contexts of incoherence, did not predict the choice to donate in any of the 
conditions, nor did it predict the amount of donation. Despite equivalent increases in 
negative affect between values conditions, there was no indication that negative affect 
played any role in donation. Negative affect has been shown to be associated with 
experiences of incoherence, with increases in negative arousal in response to dissonance-
induction tasks that can be alleviated upon implementation of a dissonance-reduction 
strategy (Elliot & Devine, 1994). Therefore, it would make sense to observe a positive 
relationship between increases in negative affect and donation. However, this was not 
observed. One reason for this could be that this experiment was internet-delivered, and 
therefore it is unknown whether incoherence was alleviated by behaviors or 
environmental factors that could not be observed (e.g., drinking alcohol, distraction, 
engaging in conversation, etc). Studies have shown that incoherence, or dissonance, can 
be resolved by engaging in behaviors that are believed to reduce the emotional arousal 
associated with it (Lee & Schwartz, 2010; Zhong & Lilienquist, 2006; Steele, Southwick, 
& Critchlow, 1981). Studies have also shown that the presence of environmental 
distractions can lead individuals to misattribute felt arousal to other factors, reducing the 
likelihood of behavior change (Schacter & Singer, 1962; Drachman & Worchel, 1976). 
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Another possibility is that the negative affect was influenced by more than just 
dissonance (or possible not influenced by dissonance at all). Negative affect may have 
been influenced by the negative valence of writing topics in both values conditions. 
Topics consisted of an array of human problems, such as disease, poverty, and mental 
health problems. These topics may have been partially, or fully, responsible for observed 
changes in negative affect.    
The mechanism by which values interventions are believed to increase valued 
action is through the establishment of reinforcement for values-oriented behaviors—a 
process that is not necessarily associated with change in affect (Hayes et al., 2001). 
Values interventions are believed to augment the intrinsic reward associated with 
behavioral adherence to values. Therefore, while negative affect is a relevant variable in 
relation to incoherence, it is not the proposed mechanism of change for values 
interventions. 
 The central finding of this study, that values interventions increased the likelihood 
for engagement in values-oriented behaviors, provides further support for the ACT 
model. As a secondary hypothesis, this study sought to better understand the question: 
which psychological factors might moderate the effectiveness of different values 
intervention techniques? While this study indeed revealed fusion was a moderator of the 
VBC procedure, it is still unknown whether this procedure delivers a therapeutic 
advantage over a simple values procedure.  
This study also revealed the important exploratory finding that negative affect 
may be associated with values procedures. This finding showed that while values 
procedures may lead to increases in negative affect, these changes in affect do not appear 
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to influence engagement in meaningful activities. It is difficult to fully understand the 
practical significance of the magnitude of the observed increase in negative affect, and 
yet the role of negative affect in values interventions is important to understand, as 
individuals with more severe levels of psychological distress and experiential avoidance 
may have difficulty engaging in values work that increases negative affect.  
Limitations 
A few factors pertaining to study methodology and design have influence on the 
interpretation of results as well as generalizability of findings to therapy settings. First, 
participants were recruited from an online national sample of Mturk workers. It can be 
assumed that MTurk workers are less likely to be fully engaged in the study than would 
be expected if participation occurred in a laboratory setting or in the context of 
psychotherapy. MTurk workers are typically under time pressure to finish tasks and earn 
enough money to make participation worthwhile. Also, since the study was conducted 
with an online sample, participants could participate from any setting of their choosing. 
While they were asked to try to limit distractions and were screened for environmental 
noise, environments were largely uncontrolled and other distraction-associated factors 
were not able to be assessed.  
The uncontrolled participation environment could also have presented 
opportunities for individuals that experienced awareness of incoherence to re-establish 
coherence in ways that were not measured in this study. The donation opportunity, which 
was offered in our study as a means for participants to engage in valued action, may not 
have been the only available opportunity for participants to exercise valued action in their 
environments. Therefore, individuals that declined the donation offer may have exercised 
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valued action in other ways (e.g., texting a friend, deciding to help out a relative or 
volunteer, etc). Also, we do not know whether participants engaged in values-oriented 
actions after participation, hence it is possible that this study did not measure the full 
impact of the values procedures. 
The values procedures in this study were somewhat different from those that 
might be delivered in psychotherapy. This intervention required less time than a values 
identification procedure might warrant in therapy. Also, clients in treatment choose their 
personal values from an open set of possible values, whereas the values procedure 
administered in this study provided a closed set of valued domains for people to choose 
from. It is therefore possible that values interventions in treatment might be more potent 
than these procedures, since choosing values from a set of all possible values as opposed 
to a selected list allows individuals to focus on their most important values.  
Lastly, it is important to recognize the role of competing values. Choosing not to 
engage in valued actions may be influenced by the importance of other values. In other 
words, there may have been values-oriented reasons not to donate as well, such as the 
fact that MTurk workers earn money through participation, and improving financial 
wellbeing by keeping their earnings could be considered valued action for other reasons. 
However, competing values can be conceptualized as a problem inherent to living; any 
choice to do something can be understood as a choice not to do something else in its 
place. As such, managing competing values is often expected to arise in psychotherapy, 
although it is important to note that characteristics of this study (e.g., payment for 
participation and MTurk sample characteristics) may have created a context for 
competition between specific values, and these were not measured or controlled for in 
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this study. Nonetheless, this study was able to show that these values procedures were 
effective despite several methodological factors that likely limited its effectiveness. 
Conclusions 
Interventions that increase awareness of personal values have shown promise in 
their ability to inspire further engagement in valued actions. Values are integral to ACT, a 
treatment that continues to grow in empirical support. Adding to the evidence base for 
ACT, researchers have confirmed the independent contribution of the theorized treatment 
components, such as values, to client outcomes. Component research is important 
because it evaluates the accuracy of the theoretical model underlying the treatment 
framework. However, a useful extension of component research would be to examine 
how these components can be most effectively targeted using the best and most 
efficacious techniques, and to examine whether client factors moderate the effectiveness 
of different techniques. Findings from research of this nature could be used to inform 
client-centered practice by helping therapists to tailor treatment delivery according to 
individual factors.  
This study confirmed the hypothesis that the effectiveness of values techniques 
may be moderated by fusion to negative self-statements. However, a full understanding 
of this relationship and treatment implications for the optimal delivery of values 
procedures is unknown. Currently, the role of affect in values procedures is not clear, and 
yet its role is important to examine, particularly in the wake of findings that negative 
affect may increase as a result of engagement in values procedures. More research is 
needed to determine how values interventions affect values-oriented behavior and 
consequent treatment outcome for individuals based on initial levels of fusion and 
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experiential avoidance. Relatedly, more studies are needed to understand the interplay 
between the six core ACT components as well as when and how to target specific 
components over the course of treatment. Research is also needed to assess the magnitude 
and impact of changes in negative affect that occur in values work and whether these 
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Amazon Mechanical Turk Recruitment 
 
 

















o Other (Please Specify) _______________ 
 
What is your age?_______ 
 
Please select your personal income level: 
o Less than $19,999/year 
o $20,000 to $29,999/year 
o $30,000 to $39,999/year 
o $40,000 to $49,999/year 
o $50,000 to $59,999/year 
o $60,000 to $69,000/year 
o $70,000 to 79,000/year 
o $80,000 to $100,000/year 
o Greater than $100,000/year 
 
How do you describe your racial/ethnic identity? 
o Asian/Pacific Islander 
o African American/Black 
o Hispanic/Latino 
o Native American 
o White/Non-Hispanic 
o Other: Please specify below____________________ 
 
What is your educational background? 
o Some high school 
o High school diploma/GED 
o Some college or post-high school technical training 
o Associates degree or college certificate 
o Bachelor's degree, college graduate 
o Some graduate school 
o Completed master's degree 
o Completed doctorate degree (MD, PhD, EdD, etc) 





The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ II; Bond et al., 2011) 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
choosing a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  

















1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I
would value.
2. I’m afraid of my feelings.
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.
5. Emotions cause problems in my life.
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.
7. Worries get in the way of my success.
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Appendix D 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire with Believability Scale (ATQ-B; Hollon 
& Kendall, 1980; Zettle & Hayes, 1986) 
The next several questions contain a variety of thoughts that pop into people’s 
heads. Please read each thought and indicate how frequently, if at all, the thought 
occurred to you over the last week (1 = “not at all”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “moderately 
often”, 4 = “often”, and 5 = “all the time”). Please read each item carefully and indicate 
the appropriate answers. Then, please indicate how strongly, if at all, you tend to believe 
that thought, when it occurs. Note that frequency and degree of belief do not need to be 
the same (1 = “not at all”, 2 = “somewhat”, 3 = “moderately “, 4 = “very much”, and 5 
= “totally).
1. I feel like I’m up against the world.
2. I’m no good.
3. Why can’t I ever succeed?
4. No one understands me.
5. I’ve let people down.
6. I don’t think I can go on.
7. I wish I were a better person.
8. I’m so weak.
9. My life’s not going the way I want it to.
10. I’m so disappointed in myself.
11. Nothing feels good anymore.
12. I can’t stand this anymore.
13. I can’t get started.
14. What’s wrong with me?
15. I wish I were somewhere else.
16. I can’t get things together.
17. I hate myself.
18. I’m worthless.
19. Wish I could just disappear.
20. What’s the matter with me?
21. I’m a loser.
22. My life is a mess.
23. I’m a failure.
24. I’ll never make it.
25. I feel so helpless.
26. Something has to change.
27. There must be something wrong with
me.
28. My future is bleak.
29. It’s just not worth it.
30. I can’t finish anything.
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Appendix E 
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988)  
Instructions: This scale contains a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. For each emotion, indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, 
at the present moment.   
        1             2  3  4  5 
 very slightly         a little      moderately       quite a bit        extremely 
































Control Condition Writing Prompt 1 
Prompt 1: Please read all of the following information. You will need to read this 
page fully to understand how to respond to the next item. Below is a list of terms related 
to time management. Time management can be defined as the conscious process of 
exercising control over the planning and use of one’s limited time to spend on a range of 
specific activities. Choose one time management practice from the list below that is 
valued in society. We realize that more than one of the above practices is considered 
valuable. Please choose only one from the following list: Staying organized; planning 
ahead; making commitments you can keep (not over-committing); keeping a schedule; 
working steadily toward deadlines; setting goals; keeping a routine, maintaining work-
life balance.  
Instructions: On the next page, please tell us why people value this specific time 
management practice and how someone might implement this practice. What you write 
should be based on general knowledge. Tell us why this practice is useful to others and 
how it might be implemented. Write continuously. Do not worry about form or style, 
spelling, punctuation, sentence structure, or grammar. If you run out of things to say, 




Values Conditions: First Writing Prompt 
 Please read all of the following information. You will need to read this page fully 
to understand how to respond to the next item.  Below is a list of problems that many 
humans face both nationally and around the world. We know that this is not a complete 
list of problems.  However, these are issues that many people have identified as 
important. Choose one issue from the list below that moves you to want to take action 
and help people in that situation. We realize that you may care about more than one of the 
issues. Please choose the issue that moves you the most right now: Hunger/famine; 
poverty; discrimination; disease (such as HIV or cancer); substance abuse, mental health 
problems; child abuse or neglect; veteran’s issues.  
 Instructions: On the next page, tell us more about why this specific human issue 
matters to you. What you write may be personal, about people you know, or it may be 
general information about the issue. All of this is acceptable as long as it tells us why you 
care about this issue. Write continuously. Do not worry about form or style, spelling, 
punctuation, sentence structure, or grammar. If you run out of things to say, repeat what 









Values Conditions: Second Writing Prompt 
Please read all of the following information. You will need to read this page fully 
to understand how to respond to the next item. On the last page you told us about an issue 
you care about. On the next page, we would like you to take a moment to tell us about 
how you choose to express your care/concern for that issue. By “express your 
care/concern” we mean expressing through your actions. There are countless ways you 
may have already done this or would like to do this. For example, some people may 
express their care/concern about discrimination by working hard to treat people as equals 
and voting in ways that they believe reflect this concern. Another person who cares about 
colon cancer may create posts in social media that raise awareness about the disease. We 
want to know how you choose to express your care/concern for this human issue. Write 
continuously. Do not worry about form or style, spelling, punctuation, sentence structure, 
or grammar. If you run out of things to say, repeat what you have already typed. Keep 











Values-Alone Condition Questions 
Below is a list of statements about actions that are often important to people that 
care about human issues, such as the issue you wrote about earlier. Please respond to 
each statement by rating how true each statement is for you according to your own 
personal sense of what is important, on a scale of 1 (Not At All True) to 7 (Extremely 
True).” 
1. I care about getting involved in solutions to human problems. 
2. It is important to take care of people who are less fortunate. 
3. I care about giving to people who are in need.  















Values with Behavior Consistency Condition Questions 
We just asked you about how you express your care and concern for human issues 
through your actions. Now we want you to reflect on your activities over the past week. 
In our daily lives, it is common to feel pulled in different directions. Most of us find that 
as much as we deeply care about other humans, the daily events that fill our lives often 
distract us from living the way we want to and doing what matters most. Sometimes we 
may forget how much we care about important human issues as we struggle under the 
weight of the many activities that fill our days. 
 On the last page you responded to statements about a range of behaviors such as 
being generous, caring for others, volunteering, and trying to make a difference. Here, 
take a moment to reflect deeply on how much you have engaged in these actions over the 
past week. How consistent were your actions with how much you care about each of the 
behaviors in the list? Please rate the degree to which over the past week your actions 
matched how important these behaviors are to you, from 1-7, with 1 being “my actions 
were not at all consistent with how important this is to me,” to 7 being, “my actions were 
very consistent with how important this is to me.” 
1. Getting involved in solutions to human problems. 
2. Taking care of people who are less fortunate. 
3. Giving to people who are in need. 






We are offering you the opportunity to donate up to the full amount of your bonus 
earnings ($2.95), to the charities below. Please select as many charities as you wish. In 
the space next to the charity, indicate how much you would like to donate. You may 
donate between $0.00 and $2.95 to each donation site, but please do not exceed $2.95 in 
donations. All donations will be submitted to charities within 30 days of your donation. 
□ American Foundation for Suicide Prevention _____ 
□ American Red Cross _____ 
□ Amnesty International _____ 
□ Brain and Behavior Research Foundation _____ 
□ ALSAC – St. Jude Children’s Hospital _____ 
□ Children’s Defense Fund _____ 
□ DAV (Disabled American Veterans) Charitable Service Trust _____ 
□ Susan G Komen for the Cure (breast cancer research) _____ 
□ American Cancer Society _____ 
□ Guide Dog Foundation for the Blind _____ 
□ The Humane Society of the United States _____ 
□ Doctors without Borders, USA _____ 






Boxplot of Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ-II; Bond et al, 2011) Scores 
by Experimental Condition 
 
Figure A2. Boxplot of AAQ-II Scores by Experimental Condition. AAQ-II is a measure 
of experiential avoidance. Scale total scores consist of the sums of item scores. VBC = 








Boxplot of Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire with Beliefs Scale Scores (ATQ-B; 
Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Zettle & Hayes, 1986) by Experimental Condition 
 
Figure A3. Boxplot of ATQ-B Scores by Experimental Condition. Scale total scores 
consist of the sums of item scores. VBC = Values-Behavior Consistency Condition. VA 






Boxplot of Negative Affect Change Scores from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) by Experimental Condition 
 
Figure A4. Boxplot of Negative Affect Change Scores from the PANAS. Change scores 
were computed by subtracting the sum of negative affect item scores from the second 
administration from the first administration. VBC = Values-Behavior Consistency 






Boxplot of Total Donation in Dollars by Experimental Condition 
 
Figure A5. Boxplot of Total Donation in Dollars by Experimental Condition. VBC = 
Values-Behavior Consistency Condition. VA = Values-Alone Condition. 
